Controlled Vocabulary for Longtermist Analysis
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Executive Summary
Section titled “Executive Summary”| Challenge | Solution | Benefit |
|---|---|---|
| Inconsistent terminology across longtermist writing | Controlled vocabulary with composable terms | Searchable, comparable concepts |
| Thousands of concepts to organize | Hierarchical specificity with modifiers | Flexible precision without explosion |
| AI is both a risk domain AND a context modifier | Separate vocabularies for each | Clearer analysis |
| Visual clutter in diagrams | Colored clickable tags | Scannable, interactive |
Terminology System
Section titled “Terminology System”Risk Domains
Section titled “Risk Domains”The primary categories of existential and catastrophic risk:
| Domain | Abbrev | Description |
|---|---|---|
| Bio | BIO | Biological/pandemic risks |
| Cyber | CYBER | Digital infrastructure attacks |
| Nuclear | NUC | Nuclear weapons/war |
| Epistemic | EPIS | Information integrity, collective reasoning |
| Authoritarian | AUTH | Lock-in of oppressive governance |
| Misaligned-AI | MAI | AI systems pursuing goals humans don’t endorse |
| Power-Concentrating-AI | PCAI | AI enabling extreme human power concentration |
| Unknown | UNK | Surprise/unforeseen threats |
Cross-Cutting Modifiers
Section titled “Cross-Cutting Modifiers”Modifiers can be appended to any domain when the distinction matters:
| Modifier | Meaning |
|---|---|
| Natural | Not human-engineered |
| Engineered | Human-created or modified |
| Emergent | Arising from system dynamics |
| Modifier | Meaning |
|---|---|
| Accidental | Unintended occurrence |
| Deliberate | Intentional action |
| Negligent | Foreseeable but ignored |
| Modifier | Meaning |
|---|---|
| State | Nation-state actors |
| Corp | Corporate entities |
| Lab | Research institutions |
| Individual | Solo actors |
| AI-Agent | Autonomous AI systems |
| Coalition | Multi-actor groups |
| Modifier | Meaning |
|---|---|
| Offensive | Capability to cause harm |
| Defensive | Capability to prevent harm |
| Modifier | Meaning |
|---|---|
| Local | Limited geographic scope |
| Regional | Multi-country impact |
| Global | Worldwide effects |
| Existential | Threatens human potential |
Composition Examples
Section titled “Composition Examples”Bio # General biological riskBio-Engineered # When engineering is relevantBio-Engineered-Deliberate # True bioweapon scenarioBio-State-Offensive # State bioweapons capability
Cyber-Individual # Lone actor cyber threatNUC-State-Accidental # Nuclear accident by state actorEPIS-Corp-Deliberate # Corporate disinformation campaignAI Stages (Context Modifier)
Section titled “AI Stages (Context Modifier)”AI stages describe when risks and interventions occur relative to transformative AI. These are abstract by default, with optional concrete annotations.
| Stage | Meaning | Character |
|---|---|---|
| Near | Close to present | High confidence about world state |
| Mid | Between Near and TAI | More uncertainty, longer-term positioning |
| TAI | Transformation point | Critical period, possibly short |
| Post-TAI | After transformation | Different action landscape |
Concrete Annotations (Optional)
Section titled “Concrete Annotations (Optional)”When making specific claims, annotate with your assumptions:
Near (~2028)Mid (TAI-50% capability)Mid (10^28 FLOP threshold)TAI (assuming 2035 timeline)The abstract terms are the controlled vocabulary. Concrete annotations clarify individual assumptions without forcing agreement on timelines.
Combining AI Stage with Risk Domains
Section titled “Combining AI Stage with Risk Domains”Every non-AI risk domain gets transformed by AI stage:
Bio-Near # Bio risks in current contextBio-Mid # Bio risks as AI advancesBio-TAI # Bio risks during transformationCyber-Mid-State # State cyber threats in mid-periodNUC-TAI-Accidental # Nuclear accident risk during TAI transitionState Variables
Section titled “State Variables”Concepts for describing the current risk landscape:
| Concept | Definition | Usage |
|---|---|---|
| Offensive-Potential | Total capability to cause harm | [Domain]-Offensive-Potential |
| Defensive-Potential | Total capability to prevent harm | [Domain]-Defensive-Potential |
| Exposure | Net vulnerability (Offensive - Defensive) | [Domain]-Exposure |
| Resilience | Ability to recover from harm | [Domain]-Resilience |
| Fragility | Susceptibility to cascading failure | [Domain]-Fragility |
Example usage:
Bio-Near-Offensive-Potential # Current bioweapon capabilityBio-Near-Defensive-Potential # Current biodefense capabilityBio-Near-Exposure # Net bio vulnerability todayIntervention Categories
Section titled “Intervention Categories”By Mechanism
Section titled “By Mechanism”| Mechanism | Description |
|---|---|
| Technical | Engineering solutions |
| Governance | Rules, laws, institutions |
| Coordination | Multi-actor agreements |
| Cultural | Norms, values, education |
| Economic | Incentive structures |
| Epistemic | Information/knowledge improvements |
By Target
Section titled “By Target”| Target | Description |
|---|---|
| Prevention | Stop bad events from occurring |
| Detection | Identify threats early |
| Mitigation | Reduce severity if occurs |
| Recovery | Restore after harm |
| Adaptation | Long-term adjustment |
Composition
Section titled “Composition”Technical-Bio-Prevention # Technical solutions to prevent biopandemicsGovernance-MAI-Detection # Governance for detecting AI misalignmentCoordination-NUC-Mitigation # International coordination to limit nuclear damageEpistemic Markers
Section titled “Epistemic Markers”For qualifying claims and tracking disagreements:
| Marker | Use |
|---|---|
| Assumption | Premise taken as given |
| Crux | Disagreement that would change conclusions if resolved |
| Uncertainty | Known unknowns |
| Speculation | Reasoned but weakly-grounded |
| Consensus | Broadly agreed upon |
| Contested | Actively disputed |
Visual Presentation
Section titled “Visual Presentation”In diagrams and interfaces, vocabulary terms appear as colored clickable tags:
Tag Display
Section titled “Tag Display”┌─────────────────────────────────────────────────────┐│ AI-enabled pandemic creation by non-state actors ││ ││ [Bio] [Engineered] [Mid] [Individual] [Deliberate] ││ red orange blue purple yellow │└─────────────────────────────────────────────────────┘Each tag:
- Has a consistent color by category (domains = red, AI stages = blue, etc.)
- Is clickable to filter/search for related concepts
- Expands on hover to show definition
Alternative Layouts
Section titled “Alternative Layouts”For different contexts:
Inline with separators:
Bio · Engineered · Mid · IndividualPrimary + context:
┌─────────────────────────────────┐│ Bio Risk │ ← Primary (large)│ in Mid period, Individual actor │ ← Context (smaller)└─────────────────────────────────┘Use Cases
Section titled “Use Cases”1. Tagging Concrete Risks
Section titled “1. Tagging Concrete Risks”When discussing specific risks, apply vocabulary tags for consistency:
| Risk Description | Tags |
|---|---|
| ”GPT-7 used to design novel pathogen” | Bio, Engineered, Mid, Deliberate |
| ”Accidental nuclear launch from AI misinterpretation” | NUC, Mid, AI-Agent, Accidental |
| ”State-sponsored disinformation undermining elections” | EPIS, Near, State, Deliberate |
| ”Recursive self-improvement leads to misaligned superintelligence” | MAI, TAI, Existential |
This enables:
- Search: Find all
Bio-Midrisks - Comparison: Compare
StatevsIndividualactor risks - Gap analysis: Which combinations have no coverage?
2. Combinatorial Risk Maps
Section titled “2. Combinatorial Risk Maps”Generate importance scores across all meaningful combinations:
Simple 2D Slice: Domain × AI Stage
Section titled “Simple 2D Slice: Domain × AI Stage”| Near | Mid | TAI | Post-TAI | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Bio | 4 | 7 | 8 | 5 |
| Cyber | 5 | 6 | 6 | 4 |
| Nuclear | 5 | 6 | 7 | 5 |
| MAI | 2 | 5 | 10 | 8 |
| EPIS | 6 | 7 | 8 | 6 |
| AUTH | 4 | 5 | 7 | 9 |
Scores are illustrative. Actual scores would be developed through structured elicitation.
Multi-Dimensional Analysis
Section titled “Multi-Dimensional Analysis”Full dimensionality:
Domain (8) × AI-Stage (4) × Actor (6) × Intent (3) × Scale (4)= 2,304 cellsWith pruning of implausible combinations (e.g., NUC-Individual-Existential), perhaps 500-1000 meaningful cells.
What This Enables
Section titled “What This Enables”- Gap analysis: High importance + low attention = opportunity
- Priority disputes made explicit: “You rate MAI-TAI as 10, I rate it 6”
- Neglectedness identification: Which cells have no interventions?
- Interaction effects: How does moving along one dimension shift others?
Open Questions
Section titled “Open Questions”Granularity Decisions
Section titled “Granularity Decisions”- Should
Cybersplit intoCyber-Infrastructure,Cyber-Financial,Cyber-Military? - Is
Power-Concentrating-AIdistinct enough fromAuthoritarian? - Do we need
AI-Accidentseparate fromMAI?
Scoring Approach
Section titled “Scoring Approach”Starting simple (single importance score), expanding over time:
- Phase 1: Single importance score (1-10)
- Phase 2: Probability × Severity decomposition
- Phase 3: Add Neglectedness, Tractability
- Phase 4: Full ITN framework per cell
Timeline Uncertainty
Section titled “Timeline Uncertainty”The AI stages are relative to TAI. How do we handle:
- People with very different TAI timelines?
- Possibility that TAI never arrives?
- Multiple transformation points rather than single TAI?
Positive Outcomes
Section titled “Positive Outcomes”Current vocabulary is risk-focused. Should we add:
Flourishing-PotentialCoordination-SuccessAlignment-Success
Implementation Notes
Section titled “Implementation Notes”Data Model
Section titled “Data Model”type RiskConcept = { domain: Domain; // Bio, Cyber, NUC, etc. aiStage?: AIStage; // Near, Mid, TAI, Post-TAI modifiers?: Modifier[]; // Engineered, State, Deliberate, etc. stageAnnotation?: string; // Optional: "~2028", "TAI-50%" importanceScore?: number; // 1-10 epistemicStatus?: EpistemicMarker; // Assumption, Crux, Contested, etc.}Serialization Format
Section titled “Serialization Format”For plain text contexts (filenames, URLs, search):
[Domain](-[Modifier])*(-[AIStage])?
Examples: bio-engineered-mid nuc-state-accidental-tai mai-existential-post-taiSources & References
Section titled “Sources & References”AI Development Frameworks
Section titled “AI Development Frameworks”- DeepMind Levels of AGI Paper - Capability-based AGI levels
- AGI Definitions Comparison - OpenAI, Anthropic, DeepMind approaches
Existential Risk Literature
Section titled “Existential Risk Literature”- How Do AI Timelines Affect Existential Risk? - LessWrong analysis
- Existential Risk from AI - Wikipedia
Related Vocabulary Projects
Section titled “Related Vocabulary Projects”- EA Forum: Crucial Consideration - Bostrom’s framework
- CFAR Double Crux - Crux terminology origin