Johns Hopkins Center for Health Security

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LLM Summary:The Johns Hopkins Center for Health Security is a well-established biosecurity organization that has significantly influenced US policy on pandemic preparedness and biological threats, with recent expansion into AI-biotechnology convergence risks. The article provides comprehensive coverage of the organization's history, activities, and impact, though it lacks critical analysis of effectiveness metrics and potential limitations.

Quick Assessment

Dimension	Rating	Notes
Impact	High	Influenced major policy decisions including US smallpox vaccine stockpiling; provides recommendations to US government, EU, and UN
Credibility	High	Designated WHO and PAHO Collaborating Centre; affiliated with Johns Hopkins Bloomberg School of Public Health
Funding	Well-funded	Received over $40M from Open Philanthropy as of 2022; $23.5M CDC grant in 2023
Focus Areas	Biosecurity, pandemic preparedness, AI-bio convergence, biological weapons prevention
Notable Work	Dark Winter (2001), Event 201 (2019), AIxBio initiatives, JAMA bioterrorism response papers

Key Links

Source	Link
Official Website	publichealth.jhu.edu
Wikipedia	en.wikipedia.org

Overview

The Johns Hopkins Center for Health Security (CHS) is an independent, nonprofit research organization affiliated with Johns Hopkins University and the Johns Hopkins Bloomberg School of Public Health.¹ Founded in 1998, it works to prevent and prepare for epidemics, pandemics, and other health disasters through research, policy analysis, and high-profile simulation exercises.²

CHS’s mission is to “protect people’s health from epidemics and disasters and ensure that communities are resilient to major challenges.”³ The organization addresses challenges including emerging infectious diseases, pandemic influenza risk, natural disasters, and biological accidents or intentional threats. Since 2023, it has significantly expanded its work on the convergence of artificial intelligence and biotechnology (AIxBio), examining biosecurity risks from AI-enabled biological research.⁴

The Center is designated an official Collaborating Centre of the World Health Organization and the Pan American Health Organization, and provides policy recommendations to governments worldwide including the United States Government, the European Union, and the United Nations Biological Weapons Convention.⁵ Its work combines independent research, policy engagement with scholars and policymakers, advocacy for stronger health security policies, and education of the next generation of health security professionals.⁶

History

Founding and Early Years (1998-2001)

CHS was founded in 1998 by D.A. Henderson, the physician who led the WHO’s successful smallpox eradication campaign.⁷ Originally named the Johns Hopkins Center for Civilian Biodefense Strategies (CCBS), it was the first academic center focused on biosecurity policy and practice.⁸ The founding team included Dr. Tara O’Toole, Dr. Tom Inglesby, and Dr. Monica Schoch-Spana, with goals of research and advocacy against bioterrorism and emerging diseases like pandemic influenza, HIV, and monkeypox.⁹

One of the Center’s early achievements was proposing that the US Government procure 40 million doses of stockpiled smallpox vaccine, a proposal supported by President Bill Clinton.¹⁰ Between 1999 and 2002, CHS published influential “JAMA papers” providing guidance on medical responses to anthrax, smallpox, plague, botulinum toxin, and Ebola—guidance that had been lacking in the US government prior to this work.¹¹ These recommendations were subsequently incorporated into the US Hospital Preparedness Program, bio-surveillance systems, countermeasures development, and pandemic planning.¹²

Post-9/11 Expansion (2001-2003)

Following the September 11, 2001 attacks and subsequent anthrax attacks, Congress appropriated $3 billion for biodefense.¹³ HHS Secretary Tommy Thompson requested Henderson lead the Office of Public Health Preparedness, which later became the Office of the Assistant Secretary for Preparedness and Response.¹⁴

In 2003, the organization was renamed the Center for Biosecurity under leadership of O’Toole and Inglesby, and moved to an affiliation with the University of Pittsburgh Medical Center (UPMC).¹⁵

Return to Johns Hopkins and Modern Era (2017-Present)

In 2017, the Center rejoined Johns Hopkins Bloomberg School of Public Health from its UPMC affiliation, with Tom Inglesby as director and CEO. The move aimed to enhance research on epidemics like Zika, Ebola, and antibiotic resistance.¹⁶ As of May 2022, the Center had received over $40 million in grants from Open Philanthropy.¹⁷

In 2023, CHS was awarded $23.5 million from the US Centers for Disease Control and Prevention for epidemic preparedness work.¹⁸

Major Activities and Research

Simulation Exercises

CHS has conducted several high-profile tabletop exercises to prepare policymakers for biological threats:

Operation Dark Winter (June 22-23, 2001): A senior-level simulation of a covert smallpox bioterrorism attack on the United States. This was the first biological weapons tabletop exercise and led to six congressional hearings.¹⁹

Atlantic Storm (January 14, 2005): A tabletop simulation of a smallpox bioterrorism event.²⁰

Event 201 (2019): Simulated a coronavirus outbreak from pig farms in Brazil, projecting 65 million deaths after 18 months with no vaccine available in the first year. This exercise, conducted with the World Economic Forum and Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation, demonstrated pandemic preparedness gaps months before the COVID-19 pandemic.²¹

Research Projects

CHS conducts research across multiple areas of health security:

COPEWELL: A conceptual framework and system dynamics model for predicting community functioning and resilience after disasters.²²
Global Catastrophic Biological Risks (GCBRs): Framework to define and analyze GCBRs, involving expert consultations to advance policy and protections against high-impact biological threats.²³
Scarce Resource Allocation During Disasters: Mixed-method community engagement study on ethical allocation of ventilators during pandemics, informing statewide frameworks.²⁴
Pandemic Prevention Program: Research and policy analysis to enhance global preparedness for infectious diseases and crises.²⁵

AI and Biotechnology Convergence

Since 2023, CHS has conducted extensive work on AIxBio—the convergence of artificial intelligence and biotechnology. On November 29, 2023, CHS hosted a convening on AI-driven biosecurity threats attended by the U.S. National Security Council, Department of Energy, White House Office of Pandemic Preparedness, UK Cabinet Office, and representatives from OpenAI, Anthropic, Microsoft, Meta, Google DeepMind, Amazon, and RAND.²⁶

In August 2024, CHS led a paper published in Science titled “AI and biosecurity: The need for governance,” calling for government evaluation of advanced AI models and implementation of safety measures.²⁷ The Center has provided policy recommendations on biological data governance, open-source models, export controls, and risk assessment to governments and AI Safety Institutes.²⁸

Dr. Jassi Pannu, a Senior Scholar at CHS, testified before the US House Committee on Energy and Commerce on December 17, 2025, regarding biosecurity at the AI-biology intersection. Pannu advocated for oversight of biological AI models, safety evaluations, and mitigations against accidents and misuse, such as large language models enabling bioweapon design.²⁹

International Engagement

The Southeast Asia Biosecurity Dialogue, a series of Track II dialogues co-hosted by CHS, contributed to the establishment of the Asia Centre for Health Security.³⁰

Leadership and Key Personnel

Tom Inglesby serves as Director and CEO. He is an internationally recognized expert in health security and former Chair of the Board of Scientific Counselors for the CDC’s Office of Public Health Preparedness and Response. He served on the 2016 Working Group assessing US biosecurity for the President’s Council of Advisors on Science and Technology.³¹

Anita Cicero is Deputy Director.³²

Caitlin Rivers is a Senior Scholar who leads epidemic preparedness projects with the CDC. She was the founding associate director of the CDC Center for Forecasting and Outbreak Analytics from August 2021 to June 2022.³³

Crystal Watson is a Senior Scholar who co-leads epidemic preparedness projects with Rivers.³⁴

Jassi Pannu, MD is a Senior Scholar focusing on AI-biosecurity issues, who has testified before Congress on these topics.³⁵

Funding

CHS receives funding from multiple sources:

Federal Government: The Center was initially funded by the US Department of Health and Human Services in 1998.³⁶ In 2023, it received a $23.5 million five-year award from the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention for epidemic preparedness.³⁷ It also receives funding from the Defense Threat Reduction Agency and Department of Defense.³⁸

Philanthropic Sources: The Alfred P. Sloan Foundation began providing funding to the Center in 2000.³⁹ Open Philanthropy (formerly the Open Philanthropy Project, through Coefficient Giving) has been a major funder, awarding $16 million over three years in January 2017, renewed for $20 million in 2019 and $10 million in 2023.⁴⁰ Open Philanthropy also recommended a grant of $381,220 to support the Health Security Scholars program and $2,744,000 for the Emerging Leaders in Biosecurity Initiative.⁴¹

In November 2024, Sentinel Bio advised an external donor to provide $1,076,000 in general support to strengthen pandemic prevention research and advocacy.⁴²

Reception and Impact

Effective Altruism Community Perspective

Within the effective altruism community, CHS has been viewed positively as a high-impact organization for longtermist biosecurity work. A 2020 EA Forum post argued that CHS was “the best donation opportunity” for addressing global catastrophic biological risks, noting that it exceeded a “very high” cost-effectiveness bar and appealed to both broad donors (due to COVID relevance) and effective altruists focused on preventing future catastrophes.⁴³

Founders Pledge has recommended CHS alongside Stanford’s Biosecurity Initiative in their report on safeguarding the long-term future.⁴⁴ The organization’s doctoral programs, fully funded by Open Philanthropy, focus on global catastrophic biological risks and health security.⁴⁵

Policy Influence

CHS has influenced major policy decisions, including the US government’s procurement of smallpox vaccine stockpiles. Following the 9/11 attacks, when CHS identified that US smallpox vaccine stockpiles had expired, HHS Secretary Tommy Thompson committed to vaccinating every American, with Congress appropriating $3 billion for biodefense.⁴⁶

The Center’s “JAMA papers” from 1999-2002 provided the first comprehensive US guidance on responding to biological threats and shaped subsequent preparedness programs.⁴⁷

Criticisms and Controversies

Misinterpretation of SPARS Pandemic Report

In 2017, CHS published “The SPARS Pandemic 2025-2028,” a self-guided exercise scenario for exploring hypothetical pandemic response challenges. Social media posts falsely claimed this report predicted a 2025 pandemic and linked it to the 2019 Event 201 simulation, implying premeditated planning of COVID-19. Fact-checking organizations have deemed these claims false, noting the report is an exercise scenario, not a forecast.⁴⁸

Event 201 Timing

Event 201’s simulation of a coronavirus pandemic in 2019, months before COVID-19 emerged, led some to question whether the exercise demonstrated foreknowledge. However, the exercise was part of CHS’s longstanding work on pandemic preparedness and reflected expert consensus about the likelihood of a coronavirus pandemic.⁴⁹

Biosecurity Policy Debates

In December 2025 congressional testimony, Jassi Pannu highlighted insufficient emphasis on societal-scale risks in defining biosafety levels, which could lead to under-tiering pandemic-capable pathogens. Pannu called for harmonizing NIH and CDC policies and governing the gene synthesis supply chain to prevent bioweapons development or accidents.⁵⁰ These recommendations reflect ongoing debates about balancing scientific freedom with biosecurity concerns.

CHS’s 2021 report “National Priorities to Combat Misinformation and Disinformation for COVID-19 and Future Public Health Threats” advocated for a US national strategy to address health misinformation, which could raise concerns among free speech advocates, though no explicit backlash was noted in available sources.⁵¹

Educational Programs

CHS offers doctoral programs focused on health security:

Health Security PhD Track: A full-time, in-person program focused on global catastrophic biological risks, fully funded by Open Philanthropy.⁵²

DrPH Track: A part-time, online program for professionals, also supported by Open Philanthropy.⁵³

Applications for the 2025-2026 academic year opened in 2024, with deadlines through SOPHAS by December 1, 2024.⁵⁴

Key Uncertainties

Several important questions remain about CHS’s work and impact:

Effectiveness measurement: While CHS has clearly influenced policy decisions like smallpox vaccine stockpiling, quantitative metrics on lives saved or outbreak severity reductions from its work are not readily available.
AI biosecurity impact: CHS has become a major voice on AI-biotechnology risks since 2023, but the effectiveness of its proposed governance frameworks remains to be demonstrated.
Simulation exercise influence: While exercises like Dark Winter and Event 201 raised awareness, the extent to which they improved actual pandemic response capabilities is unclear.
Funding sustainability: With heavy reliance on Open Philanthropy (over $40 million as of 2022), questions remain about long-term funding diversification.
International reach: While designated as a WHO Collaborating Centre, the practical impact of CHS’s international work compared to its US-focused activities is not well documented.