Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists
webThe Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists is a leading publication covering existential and catastrophic risks including nuclear weapons, biosecurity, climate change, and disruptive technologies—topics directly relevant to AI safety's broader concern with civilizational-scale risks and governance of dangerous technologies.
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Summary
The Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists is a nonprofit media organization and publication founded in 1945 by Manhattan Project scientists, focused on informing the public and policymakers about existential threats including nuclear weapons, biosecurity, climate change, and emerging disruptive technologies. It is best known for maintaining the Doomsday Clock. Its content spans analysis, policy commentary, and scientific reporting on global catastrophic risks.
Key Points
- •Covers nuclear weapons, biosecurity, climate change, and disruptive technologies as interconnected existential risk domains.
- •Publishes expert analysis and policy commentary relevant to governance of dangerous technologies.
- •Maintains the Doomsday Clock, a symbolic indicator of global catastrophic risk proximity.
- •Features coverage of autonomous weapons, gain-of-function research, and nuclear nonproliferation—topics adjacent to AI safety.
- •Serves as a key reference for researchers and policymakers concerned with civilizational-scale risks.
Cited by 1 page
| Page | Type | Quality |
|---|---|---|
| Jaan Tallinn | Person | 53.0 |
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Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists
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