CSIS Mismatch report

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Credibility Rating

4/5

High(4)

High quality. Established institution or organization with editorial oversight and accountability.

Rating inherited from publication venue: CSIS

Relevant to discussions of compute governance and AI chip export controls; provides a critical institutional perspective on whether U.S. policy tools are adequately resourced to achieve their stated AI security objectives.

Metadata

Importance: 62/100organizational reportanalysis

Summary

This CSIS analysis examines the disconnect between ambitious U.S. strategic goals for AI chip export controls and the insufficient resources allocated to enforce and implement those controls effectively. It argues that without adequate funding and institutional capacity, export control policies targeting advanced AI chips risk being largely ineffective. The report highlights the gap between policy ambition and operational reality in restricting adversary access to cutting-edge compute.

Key Points

•U.S. AI chip export control policies are strategically ambitious but chronically underfunded, creating a significant implementation gap.
•Enforcement agencies lack sufficient personnel, technology, and budget to monitor and police the complex global semiconductor supply chain.
•The mismatch undermines the effectiveness of controls aimed at limiting adversaries' access to advanced AI compute.
•Policy credibility requires matching resource commitments to stated strategic objectives in export control regimes.
•Without closing the budget-strategy gap, export controls may provide false assurance while failing to achieve intended security outcomes.

Cited by 1 page

Page	Type	Quality
US AI Chip Export Controls	Policy	73.0

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Mismatch of Strategy and Budgets in AI Chip Export Controls 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 

 

 
 
 
 
 
 

 

 
 
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 Mismatch of Strategy and Budgets in AI Chip Export Controls 

 
 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 

 

 
 

 
 Photo: Dan74/Adobe Stock

 
 
 

 
 
 
 
 

 

 
 

 
 
 
 

 
 
 
 
 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 

 
 

 
 
 
 
 
 

 
 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 

 
 

 
 
 
 
 

 
 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 

 
 

 

 
 
 

 

 
 
 Commentary
 by 
 
 Gregory C. Allen 
 
 
 

 Published October 29, 2024

 
 

 

 
 
 
 
 

 

 

 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Remote Visualization 
 
 

 

 
 

 
 
 
 
 

 
 
 
 
 This commentary is part of a report from the CSIS Economic Security and Technology Department, titled Staying Ahead in the Global Technology Race. The report features a set of essays outlining key issues on economic security for the next administration, including global technology competition, industrialization policies, economic partnerships, and global governance. 

 
 

 

 
 
 
 
 

 
 
 
 Read the Full Report 
 

 

 
 
 
 
 

 
 
 
 
 Two dates from 2022 are likely to echo in geopolitical history. The first, Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine on February 24, hardly needs further explanation. The second is one that many Americans may not recognize. On October 7, 2022, the U.S. Department of Commerce issued new export control regulations that placed a de facto ban on U.S. sales to China of the most advanced computer chip hardware that powers modern artificial intelligence (AI) models.

 The United States and China agree that leadership in AI technology is critical to the future of military power. For years, Chinese government and military procurement records openly advertised the desire for U.S. chips to power Chinese AI surveillance systems and new AI military supercomputing facilities. Since more than 90 percent of AI chips used in Chinese data centers are designed by U.S. semiconductor companies and are therefore subject to U.S. export controls, loss of access to the U.S. chip market could put China’s entire future as an AI superpower in jeopardy.

 Grand historical turning points rarely take the form of long bureaucratic documents, but the October 7 export controls were one of those rare times. Ten days after the new regulations came out, Secretary of State Antony Blinken said : “We are at an inflection point. The post–Cold War world has come to an end, and there is an intense competition underway to shape what comes next. And at the heart of that competition is technology.”

 Blinken is right. Even though the October 7 export controls were in many ways narrowly targeted on only the most advanced AI chips and chipmaking tools, as a whole, the policy marked a major reversal of over 25 years of trade and technology policy toward China in at least three ways.

 First, the controls were targeted at multiple chokepoints across th

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