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Problem profile: Preventing catastrophic pandemics
webCredibility Rating
3/5
Good(3)Good quality. Reputable source with community review or editorial standards, but less rigorous than peer-reviewed venues.
Rating inherited from publication venue: 80,000 Hours
This 80,000 Hours problem profile is a key reference for the effective altruism community's prioritization of engineered pandemic risk, complementing AI safety as a top concern and guiding career decisions in biosecurity.
Metadata
Importance: 62/100organizational reportanalysis
Summary
80,000 Hours' problem profile on catastrophic pandemic prevention, focusing primarily on engineered pandemics as an existential risk. It argues this is one of the world's most pressing problems due to advances in biotechnology that could enable the creation of pathogens far deadlier than natural ones, and outlines career paths and interventions to reduce this risk.
Key Points
- •Engineered pandemics are ranked among the top global catastrophic risks alongside power-seeking AI and extreme power concentration.
- •Advances in synthetic biology and dual-use research lower barriers for creating dangerous pathogens, increasing risk of deliberate or accidental catastrophe.
- •Biorisk research, strategy, and policy is highlighted as a high-impact career path for those wanting to work on this problem.
- •The profile uses 80,000 Hours' framework of scale, tractability, and neglectedness to evaluate this as a priority area.
- •Interventions include biosecurity policy, international governance, detection systems, and reducing dual-use research risks.
Cited by 1 page
| Page | Type | Quality |
|---|---|---|
| Bioweapons Risk | Risk | 91.0 |
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On this page:
1 Summary
2 Why focus your career on preventing severe pandemics? 2.1 Natural pandemics show how destructive biological threats can be
2.2 Engineered pathogens could be even more dangerous
2.3 Mirror bacteria illustrate the possibility of engineered catastrophic biorisks
2.4 Both accidental and deliberate misuse are threats
2.5 Overall, the risk seems substantial
2.6 Reducing catastrophic biological risks is highly valuable according to a range of worldviews
2.7 How do catastrophic biorisks compare to AI risk?
3 There are clear actions we can take to reduce these risks
4 Two example ways to reduce catastrophe biological risks 4.1 1. Strengthen the Biological Weapons Convention
4.2 2. Govern dual-use research of concern
5 What jobs are available?
6 Want to work on reducing risks of the worst biological disasters? We want to help.
7 Learn more 7.1 Top recommendations
7.2 Further recommendations
Some of the deadliest events in history have been pandemics. COVID-19 demonstrated that we’re still vulnerable to these events, and future outbreaks could be far more lethal.
In fact, we face the possibility of biological disasters that are worse than ever before due to developments in technology.
The chances of such catastrophic pandemics — bad enough to potentially derail civilisation and threaten humanity’s future — seem uncomfortably high. We believe this risk is one of the world’s most pressing problems.
And there are a number of practical options for reducing global catastrophic biological risks (GCBRs). So we think working to reduce GCBRs is one of the most promising ways to safeguard the future of humanity right now.
Summary
Scale
Pandemics — especially engineered pandemics — pose a significant risk to the existence of humanity. Though the risk is difficult to assess, some researchers estimate that there is a greater than 1 in 10,000 chance of a biological catastrophe leading to human extinction within the next 100 years, and potentially as high as 1 in 100. (See below .) And a biological catastrophe killing a large percentage of the population is even more likely — and could contribute to existential risk .
Neglectedness
Pandemic prevention is currently moderately resourced. Even in the aftermath of the COVID-19 outbreak, spending on biodefense in the US, for instance, has only grown modestly — from an estimated $17 billion in 2019 to $24 billion in 2023.
One estimate in April 2024 found that global spending on mitigating and preventing disease outbreaks was around $130 billion. But it found that interventions and research agendas specifically targeted at preventing the most catastrophic biological disasters remain neglected.
Solvability
There are promising approaches to improve biosecurity and reduc
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