Proliferation
proliferationriskPath: /knowledge-base/risks/proliferation/
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"llmSummary": "AI proliferation accelerated dramatically as the capability gap narrowed from 18 to 6 months (2022-2024), with open-source models like DeepSeek R1 now matching frontier performance. US export controls reduced China's compute share from 37% to 14% but failed to prevent capability parity through algorithmic innovation, leaving proliferation's net impact on safety deeply uncertain.",
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"text": "Qwen overtook Llama in downloads 2025",
"url": "https://www.red-line.ai/p/state-of-open-source-ai-2025",
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"text": "Overtook LLaMA in total downloads by mid-2025",
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"text": "the gap narrowing to just 1.7% on some benchmarks by 2025",
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"text": "30% of Python code written by US open-source contributors was AI-generated in 2024",
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"text": "Trump administration rescinds AI Diffusion Rule",
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"text": "Huawei will produce only 200,000 AI chips in 2025, while Nvidia produces 4-5 million",
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"text": "DeepSeek R1 generated CBRN info \"that can't be found on Google\"",
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"text": "China's AI Safety Governance Framework 2.0 (Sep 2024)",
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"eaForum": "https://forum.effectivealtruism.org/topics/proliferation"
}Backlinks (36)
| id | title | type | relationship |
|---|---|---|---|
| proliferation-risk-model | AI Proliferation Risk Model | analysis | related |
| proliferation-model | AI Capability Proliferation Model | analysis | analyzes |
| compute-governance | Compute Governance | policy | — |
| coordination-tech | AI Governance Coordination Technologies | approach | — |
| open-source | Open Source AI Safety | approach | — |
| structured-access | Structured Access / API-Only | approach | — |
| ai-enabled-untraceable-misuse | AI-Enabled Untraceable Misuse | risk | — |
| scientific-research | Scientific Research Capabilities | capability | — |
| agi-development | AGI Development | concept | — |
| autonomous-weapons-proliferation | LAWS Proliferation Model | analysis | — |
| bioweapons-attack-chain | Bioweapons Attack Chain Model | analysis | — |
| capability-alignment-race | Capability-Alignment Race Model | analysis | — |
| cyberweapons-attack-automation | Autonomous Cyber Attack Timeline | analysis | — |
| multi-actor-landscape | Multi-Actor Strategic Landscape | analysis | — |
| multipolar-trap-dynamics | Multipolar Trap Dynamics Model | analysis | — |
| racing-dynamics-impact | Racing Dynamics Impact Model | analysis | — |
| risk-activation-timeline | Risk Activation Timeline Model | analysis | — |
| risk-interaction-matrix | Risk Interaction Matrix Model | analysis | — |
| short-timeline-policy-implications | Short Timeline Policy Implications | analysis | — |
| conjecture | Conjecture | organization | — |
| meta-ai | Meta AI (FAIR) | organization | — |
| palisade-research | Palisade Research | organization | — |
| rethink-priorities | Rethink Priorities | organization | — |
| securebio | SecureBio | organization | — |
| jaan-tallinn | Jaan Tallinn | person | — |
| toby-ord | Toby Ord | person | — |
| california-sb53 | California SB 53 | policy | — |
| dangerous-cap-evals | Dangerous Capability Evaluations | approach | — |
| international-regimes | International Compute Regimes | policy | — |
| autonomous-weapons | Autonomous Weapons | risk | — |
| disinformation | Disinformation | risk | — |
| irreversibility | AI-Induced Irreversibility | risk | — |
| learned-helplessness | Epistemic Learned Helplessness | risk | — |
| structural-overview | Structural Risks (Overview) | concept | — |
| surveillance | Mass Surveillance | risk | — |
| governance-focused | Governance-Focused Worldview | concept | — |