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Bioweapons

bioweaponsriskPath: /knowledge-base/risks/bioweapons/
E42Entity ID (EID)
← Back to page32 backlinksQuality: 91Updated: 2026-02-22
Page Recorddatabase.json — merged from MDX frontmatter + Entity YAML + computed metrics at build time
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  "wikiId": "E42",
  "path": "/knowledge-base/risks/bioweapons/",
  "filePath": "knowledge-base/risks/bioweapons.mdx",
  "title": "Bioweapons",
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  "causalLevel": "outcome",
  "lastUpdated": "2026-02-22",
  "dateCreated": "2026-02-15",
  "summary": "Comprehensive synthesis of AI-bioweapons evidence through early 2026, including the FRI expert survey finding 5x risk increase from AI capabilities (0.3% → 1.5% annual epidemic probability), Anthropic's ASL-3 activation for Claude Opus 4, and OpenAI's o3 reaching 94th percentile on virology tests. Key developments: DNA screening now catches 97% of threats post-patch, but open-source models (DeepSeek) lack safeguards. Expert consensus: safeguards can reduce risk nearly to baseline even with advanced AI capabilities.",
  "description": "AI-assisted biological weapon development represents one of the most severe near-term AI risks.",
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    "actionability": 6.2
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  "category": "risks",
  "subcategory": "misuse",
  "clusters": [
    "ai-safety",
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    "governance"
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    {
      "text": "CSIS 2025",
      "url": "https://www.csis.org/analysis/opportunities-strengthen-us-biosecurity-ai-enabled-bioterrorism-what-policymakers-should",
      "resourceId": "12ae69aa3e564704",
      "resourceTitle": "Opportunities to Strengthen U.S. Biosecurity from AI-Enabled ... - CSIS"
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      "text": "CSIS Policy Analysis",
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      "resourceId": "12ae69aa3e564704",
      "resourceTitle": "Opportunities to Strengthen U.S. Biosecurity from AI-Enabled ... - CSIS"
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    {
      "text": "Anthropic Biorisk Methodology",
      "url": "https://red.anthropic.com/2025/biorisk/",
      "resourceId": "10e5570538c2bd44",
      "resourceTitle": "Biorisk - Anthropic"
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    {
      "text": "Opportunities to Strengthen U.S. Biosecurity from AI-Enabled Bioterrorism",
      "url": "https://www.csis.org/analysis/opportunities-strengthen-us-biosecurity-ai-enabled-bioterrorism-what-policymakers-should",
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      "text": "Biorisk Evaluations",
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      "resourceTitle": "Biorisk - Anthropic"
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        "title": "Why Alignment Might Be Hard",
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        "title": "Deep Learning Revolution (2012-2020)",
        "path": "/knowledge-base/history/deep-learning-era/",
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  "changeHistory": [
    {
      "date": "2026-02-18",
      "branch": "claude/review-pr-216-P4Fcu",
      "title": "Fix audit report findings from PR #216",
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      "date": "2026-02-18",
      "branch": "claude/audit-webpage-errors-X4jHg",
      "title": "Audit wiki pages for factual errors and hallucinations",
      "summary": "Systematic audit of ~20 wiki pages for factual errors, hallucinations, and inconsistencies. Found and fixed 25+ confirmed errors across 17 pages, including wrong dates, fabricated statistics, false attributions, missing major events, broken entity references, misattributed techniques, and internal inconsistencies."
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External Links
{
  "wikipedia": "https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Biological_warfare",
  "eaForum": "https://forum.effectivealtruism.org/topics/global-catastrophic-biological-risk",
  "eightyK": "https://80000hours.org/problem-profiles/preventing-catastrophic-pandemics/",
  "grokipedia": "https://grokipedia.com/page/Biological_warfare"
}
Backlinks (32)
idtitletyperelationship
misuse-risksAI Misuse Risk Cruxescrux—
bioweapons-attack-chainBioweapons Attack Chain Modelanalysisrelated
bioweapons-ai-upliftAI Uplift Assessment Modelanalysisrelated
bioweapons-timelineAI-Bioweapons Timeline Modelanalysisrelated
marc-andreessenMarc Andreessenperson—
compute-governanceCompute Governanceconcept—
cyberweaponsCyberweapons Riskrisk—
proliferationAI Proliferationrisk—
large-language-modelsLarge Language Modelsconcept—
scientific-researchScientific Research Capabilitiescapability—
mainstream-eraMainstream Era (2020-Present)historical—
__index__/knowledge-baseKnowledge Baseconcept—
capability-threshold-modelCapability Threshold Modelanalysis—
risk-activation-timelineRisk Activation Timeline Modelanalysis—
blueprint-biosecurityBlueprint Biosecurityorganization—
frontier-model-forumFrontier Model Forumorganization—
securebioSecureBioorganization—
max-tegmarkMax Tegmarkperson—
toby-ordToby Ordperson—
ai-safety-institutesAI Safety Institutespolicy—
anthropic-core-viewsAnthropic Core Viewssafety-agenda—
capability-unlearningCapability Unlearning / Removalapproach—
evalsEvals & Red-teamingresearch-area—
evaluationAI Evaluationapproach—
lab-cultureAI Lab Safety Cultureapproach—
red-teamingRed Teamingresearch-area—
refusal-trainingRefusal Trainingapproach—
seoul-declarationSeoul AI Safety Summit Declarationpolicy—
technical-researchTechnical AI Safety Researchcrux—
thresholdsCompute Thresholdsconcept—
__index__/knowledge-base/risksAI Risksconcept—
misuse-overviewMisuse Risks (Overview)concept—