EA Institutions' Response to the FTX Collapse
Quick Assessment
| Dimension | Assessment |
|---|---|
| Event | FTX collapse (November 2022) and EA institutional response |
| Key Figures | Will MacAskill, Nick Beckstead, Peter Singer, Sam Bankman-Fried |
| Primary Institutions | Centre for Effective Altruism, FTX Future Fund, Open Philanthropy |
| Funding Committed | $160M+ in Future Fund grants and investments, the majority halted or subject to clawback |
| Trust Impact | >30% of EA community survey respondents reported substantially losing trust in EA public figures |
| Community Sentiment | Satisfaction declined approximately 0.5–1 points on a 10-point scale (n=1,312) |
| Criminal Outcome | SBF convicted on all 7 counts (November 2, 2023); sentenced to 25 years (March 28, 2024) |
| Institutional Restructuring | Effective Ventures paid $26.8M FTX settlement; decentralized into independent organizations (2024) |
Key Links
| Source | Link |
|---|---|
| Official EA Forum coverage | forum.effectivealtruism.org |
| EA Forum: Community Impact Survey | How has FTX's collapse impacted EA? |
| Rethink Priorities Survey Results | ftx-community-response-survey-results |
| EA Forum: FTX Cultural Critique | The FTX crisis highlights a deeper cultural problem within EA |
| Philanthropy News Digest | FTX's collapse expected to impact effective altruism movement |
| EV Updates: FTX Settlement | EV Updates: FTX Settlement and the Future of EV |
| SBF Trial — Wikipedia | Trial of Sam Bankman-Fried |
| TIME investigation | EA Leaders Were Warned About SBF |
Overview
The collapse of FTX in November 2022 was a crisis for the effective altruism (EA) movement with consequences that unfolded over the following two years. Sam Bankman-Fried (SBF), the founder of FTX, had been one of EA's most prominent and financially significant members, pledging the majority of his wealth to effective causes and channeling hundreds of millions of dollars through the FTX Future Fund. When FTX imploded following revelations about the entanglement of Alameda Research's finances with customer funds, the shock rippled immediately through EA institutions, damaging trust, disrupting funding pipelines, and prompting extensive community self-examination.1
EA institutions responded through a combination of public condemnation of SBF's alleged fraud, operational pauses on grant-making, emergency funding efforts to support affected organizations, and community surveys to assess the damage. The response was complicated by subsequent reporting indicating that EA leaders had received warnings about SBF's behavior and business practices as early as 2018—warnings that, according to sources interviewed by TIME, were downplayed or rationalized rather than acted upon.2 This revelation added a layer of institutional accountability questions to the crisis beyond those raised by the fraud itself.
Despite significant erosion of trust in EA leadership, survey data suggested that the EA community's attachment to its underlying philosophical principles remained comparatively resilient. The crisis nonetheless exposed structural vulnerabilities in EA's reliance on a small number of extremely wealthy donors, prompted calls for governance reform, and left a lasting mark on EA's public reputation and funding landscape.
Subsequent developments extended well beyond the initial months of crisis management. SBF was convicted on all seven counts of fraud and conspiracy in November 2023 and sentenced to 25 years in federal prison in March 2024. Effective Ventures—the UK/US umbrella entity that housed the Centre for Effective Altruism and numerous other EA projects—paid $26.8 million to settle with FTX's bankruptcy estate, underwent a complete board turnover, and announced a comprehensive decentralization plan under which its major projects would spin out as independent organizations.
Background: EA's Ties to FTX
Prior to November 2022, SBF and other senior FTX and FTX/Alameda Research leaders collectively represented the second-largest group of benefactors to the EA movement, surpassed only by Open Philanthropy and Good Ventures (the philanthropic vehicle of Cari Tuna and Dustin Moskovitz).3 SBF had become publicly associated with EA's "earning to give" strategy—the idea that accumulating wealth through a high-income career in order to donate aggressively could produce more impact than direct nonprofit work.
The FTX Future Fund, a charitable organization bankrolled by SBF, had committed approximately $160 million in grants and investments by September 2022 across a range of EA-aligned causes, including global health, biosecurity, and AI safety—all in under nine months of operation.3 This made it one of the most significant new philanthropic actors in the EA ecosystem in a very short time. Organizations ranging from university research centers to small nonprofits in the developing world had built multiyear plans around expected Future Fund support.
SBF's personal profile within EA was significant. Will MacAskill, the Oxford moral philosopher and co-founder of the Centre for Effective Altruism, had publicly endorsed SBF in media appearances, tweets, and interviews as an exemplary practitioner of EA's earning-to-give approach. MacAskill's personal promotion of SBF—distinct from any formal institutional endorsement by CEA—meant that the FTX collapse implicated not just a peripheral donor but a figure whose credibility had been publicly vouched for by EA's most prominent intellectual leader.2 It is worth distinguishing this individual promotion from the earning-to-give strategy itself: the strategy was developed and endorsed by many EA thinkers independently of SBF, and critics and defenders alike have debated whether SBF's conduct reflects on the strategy or primarily on the individuals who promoted him specifically.
Nick Beckstead, who had spent over seven years at Open Philanthropy and served as a board member of Effective Ventures, left Open Philanthropy to become CEO of the FTX Foundation and executive director of the FTX Future Fund in November 2021.4 His dual role—running the Future Fund while sitting on the boards of EA's central umbrella organization—made him a key figure in the crisis that followed.
Immediate Institutional Response
The day FTX declared bankruptcy—November 11, 2022—the FTX Future Fund team, including Nick Beckstead, announced their resignation. Their public statement said they were "now unable to perform our work or process grants," that they were "devastated that it looks like there are many committed grants that the Future Fund will be unable to honor," and that they had "fundamental questions about the legitimacy and integrity of the business operations that were funding the FTX Foundation and the Future Fund."4 The fund halted all grant processing. This left committed grants in limbo and forced recipient organizations to scramble for alternative funding.5 For example, Rajalakshmi Children Foundation, which had been expecting multiyear support from the Future Fund, received no communication from the FTX Foundation and had to seek emergency donors elsewhere.5
MacAskill was among the EA leaders who responded publicly within days of the collapse. In statements circulated on social media, he described experiencing a combination of anger at SBF for allegedly deceiving him and self-criticism for having trusted SBF. He also emphasized that EA principles are fundamentally opposed to "ends justify the means" reasoning, positioning the alleged fraud as a violation of—rather than a product of—EA's philosophical commitments.6
Peter Singer, widely regarded as the intellectual founder of the EA movement, addressed the collapse in an interview published in The Guardian in December 2022, in which he stated that "wise, effective altruists and utilitarians know that honesty is the best policy," and argued that the broader record of EA's "earning to give" approach remained net positive despite the FTX collapse.7
Open Philanthropy announced via the EA Forum on November 16, 2022 that it was seeking applications from grantees affected by the FTX Future Fund collapse who fell within its longtermist focus areas—biosecurity, AI risk, and EA community-building. Eligibility included organizations that never received some or all of their committed funds, and those that had received funds but wished to set them aside to return to creditors. Open Philanthropy clarified at the time that it had never received any donations from FTX, the Future Fund, or individuals who worked there.8 The only publicly documented specific disbursement from Open Philanthropy's emergency program was $753,162 to support career transition plans for a number of FTX Future Fund grantees.9
Community Impact: Survey Data
A December 2022 survey conducted by Rethink Priorities in collaboration with the Centre for Effective Altruism provided the most systematic picture of how the collapse affected the EA community.10
Methodology: The survey was added as a section to the 2022 EA Survey. A total of 3,567 respondents completed the broader EA Survey; of these, 1,012 agreed to answer the FTX section. An additional 300 respondents completed a separate FTX survey link provided for those who had already completed the EA Survey, bringing the total sample for FTX-related questions to 1,312 respondents. Surveys closed on January 1, 2023. The survey was authored by David Moss and Willem Sleegers of Rethink Priorities. Because respondents were recruited through EA-affiliated channels, results are most representative of already-engaged EA community members rather than the general public or casual followers.11
The headline finding was that community satisfaction declined by approximately 0.5–1 points on a 10-point scale, with overall sentiment remaining on the positive side at roughly 7.5 out of 10. The distribution of specific concerns was as follows:
- 58% of respondents reported the crisis gave them concerns about EA meta-organizations
- 55% reported concerns about the EA community and its norms
- 48% reported concerns about leaders of EA meta-organizations
- Over 30% reported substantially losing trust in EA public figures or leadership10
The data also captured responses related to behavior change. Approximately 31% of respondents reported that they stopped referring to "EA" by name while continuing to promote EA ideas and projects, and 15% temporarily paused EA promotion entirely. Only 6% reported permanently ceasing EA promotion.12
The philosophical core of EA appeared more insulated from the damage than its institutional layer. Only 25% of respondents agreed that the crisis gave them concerns about EA principles or philosophy, compared to 66% who disagreed.10 On the question of whether EA had responded well to the crisis, 47% agreed and 21% disagreed, with the remainder neutral or ambivalent.10
A separate strand of the Rethink Priorities research examined university students (not EA-affiliated) surveyed from November 2022 to February 2023. Most of these respondents had not previously encountered EA. Only 13 of 233 (5.6%) university students who had encountered EA found FTX or SBF salient enough to mention unprompted, and among those aware of EA but not additionally aware of FTX, attitudes toward EA may have been unaffected or slightly positive post-collapse.11
Funding Consequences
The financial consequences of the collapse were significant across multiple dimensions.
Committed grants halted or clawed back: The FTX Future Fund had committed more than $160 million to over 110 nonprofits by the time of the collapse.13 FTX's new bankruptcy management demanded return of funds by end of February 2023, threatening legal action against non-compliant recipients. The Alignment Research Center voluntarily returned its $1.25 million FTX Foundation grant, stating the money "morally (if not legally) belongs to FTX customers or creditors."13 ProPublica returned the initial $1.6 million of what was to have been a three-year, $5 million grant.14 FTX paid the Center for AI Safety $6.5 million between May and September 2022; the FTX bankruptcy estate subsequently probed this payment.15 Stanford's Center for Innovation in Global Health had received $1.5 million from the Future Fund for pandemic-prevention seed grants and removed public mention of the grant from its communications following the collapse; Stanford has not publicly explained this decision.13
Impact on individual researchers and small organizations: PhD student Korbinian Kettnaker at Cambridge was among those forced to drop out when his FTX funding did not materialize. Researchers at Cambridge, Princeton, Brown, and Cornell had received or expected Future Fund support.14 Josh Morrison, head of 1Day Sooner (a pandemic preparedness research nonprofit), described the situation as "definitely a mess" after receiving $375,000 from the Future Fund and FTX Foundation.15
Broader funding landscape effects: The collapse caused a substantial contraction in expected longtermist funding. EA Funds' Long-Term Future Fund and Infrastructure Fund reported funding gaps of roughly $450,000 and $550,000 per month respectively following FTX's implosion.16 Open Philanthropy paused most new longtermist funding commitments in Potential Risks from Advanced AI, Biosecurity and Pandemic Preparedness, and EA Community Growth in the immediate aftermath.17
New Giving What We Can pledges reportedly dropped by approximately 70% in the period following the collapse, and EA Forum metrics—posts and engagement levels—peaked around the time of the collapse before declining from prior growth trends.18
Nick Beckstead: Role, Recusal, and Departure
Nick Beckstead's role in the crisis occupied a particular position in subsequent accountability discussions. As CEO of the FTX Foundation and executive director of the FTX Future Fund, he oversaw the disbursement of over $160 million in grants and investments during the fund's nine-month existence. He was simultaneously a board member of both Effective Ventures UK and Effective Ventures US—the umbrella entity housing the Centre for Effective Altruism and other major EA projects.419
According to TIME's March 2023 investigation, Beckstead was among EA leaders personally notified about SBF's questionable behavior and business ethics by 2019. When TIME sought detailed responses from him about these warnings and what steps were taken, he declined to answer, citing an independent investigation that had been commissioned.2
Following the collapse, Beckstead was recused from all board matters related to FTX beginning in November 2022. On August 23, 2023—nearly a year after the collapse—he stepped down from both EV boards. The announcement stated that the recusal "made it difficult for him to add sufficient value to EV and its projects," which both Beckstead and other trustees agreed was sufficient reason for him to step down.19 EA Forum commenters raised pointed questions about governance: why he had remained on the boards for nearly a year after the collapse while recused from the central crisis-related matters.19
EA Forum discussion at the time of the TIME article publication debated "whether Nick did the right thing ex ante when he chose to run the Future Fund" and what standard of evidence or argument would be needed to hold board members accountable in such circumstances.20
Prior Warnings and Institutional Accountability
Perhaps the most contested element of the post-collapse reckoning was the emergence of reporting indicating that EA leaders had received serious warnings about SBF's behavior years before the collapse. According to sources who spoke to TIME, concerns about Bankman-Fried's conduct at Alameda Research—including allegations of pervasive dishonesty, sloppy accounting, and rejection of corporate controls—had been raised within EA circles as early as 2018.2
According to these sources, the concerns were characterized as typical startup disputes or dismissed as "he said-she said" rather than prompting substantive action. Sources familiar with the EA community at the time suggested it was implausible that prominent EA leaders were unaware of quite a lot of the details regarding Alameda's internal problems, describing the situation as a significant event within the EA community.2 The TIME investigation also reported that CEA had conducted an internal investigation relating to CEA and Alameda sometime in 2019, conducted in part by MacAskill himself, though the full findings and conclusions of that investigation have not been made public.2
EA leaders who were contacted by TIME declined or did not respond to requests to explain their reactions to these warnings or what steps they took. Federal prosecutors identified 2019 as the start of Bankman-Fried's alleged criminal fraud—after the initial warnings had been raised—and no sources alleged that EA leaders had advance knowledge of specific criminal conduct. The TIME reporting represented one account, drawing on sources sympathetic to those raising concerns; EA leaders' own characterizations of what was known and when have not been set out in detail publicly, meaning the full record remains incomplete.
MacAskill publicly acknowledged in the aftermath that the movement needed to engage in serious self-examination and that EA needed to make clear it does not see itself as above common-sense ethical norms.6 As of November 2023, following SBF's conviction, MacAskill declined to be interviewed by the New Statesman and had offered no further detailed public account of the events.21
SBF's Criminal Trial, Conviction, and Sentencing
On November 2, 2023, Sam Bankman-Fried was convicted by a federal jury in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York on all seven counts he faced: wire fraud against FTX customers, wire fraud against Alameda Research lenders, conspiracy to commit securities fraud against FTX investors, conspiracy to commit commodities fraud, and conspiracy to commit money laundering. Co-operators Caroline Ellison and Gary Wang had pleaded guilty and cooperated with prosecutors.22
On March 28, 2024, Judge Lewis Kaplan sentenced SBF to 25 years in federal prison, three years of supervised release, and required him to forfeit $11.2 billion in illegal proceeds. Prosecutors had requested 40–50 years; the defense requested a substantially shorter sentence. Judge Kaplan specifically addressed SBF's "expected value" reasoning during sentencing, citing testimony from Caroline Ellison that SBF would take a coin-flip bet between "destroying the world" and doubling its goodness. Kaplan stated that SBF "will be in a position to do something very bad in the future, and it's not a trivial risk."23
No major EA institution—including CEA or Open Philanthropy—issued a formal public statement specifically addressing the conviction or the sentencing. EA Forum community discussion at the time of sentencing noted that SBF "did terrible acts from many different moral viewpoints, including that of consequentialism" and "harmed the EA movement," while some commenters observed that, for those who believed he had acted from a sincere desire to do good, the situation felt like "a tragedy, though a necessary one."24
Effective Ventures Restructuring
One of the most concrete institutional consequences of the FTX collapse was the comprehensive restructuring of Effective Ventures (EV)—the UK/US umbrella entity that served as fiscal sponsor and legal host for the Centre for Effective Altruism, 80,000 Hours, Giving What We Can, and numerous other EA projects.
UK Charity Commission inquiry: The UK Charity Commission opened a statutory inquiry into EV UK in December 2022, triggered by the collapse. In May 2024, the Commission published its report, finding that trustees had taken appropriate steps to protect the charity's funds and complied with their legal duties—concluding there was no evidence of mismanagement warranting intervention.25
Independent investigation: EV commissioned an independent investigation from the law firm Mintz, which reviewed tens of thousands of documents and conducted dozens of witness interviews. The investigation concluded in September 2023 with no evidence that anyone at EV knew about FTX's criminal fraud.26
FTX settlement: In December 2023, EV announced settlements with the FTX bankruptcy estate. EV UK and EV US together paid $26,786,503—equal to 100% of funds received from FTX in 2022.26
Decentralization: EV simultaneously announced a plan to decentralize the EA ecosystem by offboarding its projects into independent legal entities over a 1–2 year period. In January 2024, CEA formally announced it was spinning out from EV to become an independent organization.27
Governance changes: EV underwent 100% board turnover on both its UK and US boards following the collapse. New CEOs were hired: Zach Robinson for EV US and Rob Gledhill for EV UK. Finance and legal teams were strengthened, and policies were updated with more robust controls. Tasha McCauley and Claire Zabel, who had stayed on the EV UK board beyond when they had originally planned to step down in order to guide EV through the crisis, stepped down in February 2024.28 EV adopted a communications policy requiring central approval for all FTX-related public communications.26
Lessons identified: In a October 2024 retrospective published on the EA Forum, EV US CEO Zach Robinson described how the FTX collapse prompted EV to recognize how much the organization needed to mature—particularly in needing empowered CEO and chief-of-staff roles that could make cross-entity decisions faster than a board could.26
Governance and Structural Critiques
Beyond the specific failures related to SBF, critics argued that the FTX collapse reflected broader governance weaknesses within EA institutions. These included the use of small, homogeneous boards with limited independence from major donors, the absence of meaningful community input into major institutional decisions, and a broader cultural pattern that some argued involved tolerating risks when the potential philanthropic payoff appeared large enough.29
One framework applied to Centre for Effective Altruism's parent entity, Effective Ventures, characterized its board governance as operating at an early "start-up" stage despite the organization running programs of considerably greater scale and maturity. Critics argued that advisory panels established to provide oversight had in practice been ineffective, with at least one notable panel dissolving without meaningful output.29
Some critics characterized the rapid growth of the FTX Future Fund—committing $160 million in under nine months with limited external oversight—as illustrating a broader risk in how large concentrations of donor-controlled capital can receive legitimacy from EA's allocative frameworks without adequate accountability mechanisms. EA defenders have responded that the fraud originated entirely in SBF's criminal conduct and that the governance of EA institutions is a separate question from the criminal liability of a donor.5
A cross-organizational reform project involving Julia Wise (CEA/GiveWell), Ozzie Gooen (QURI), and Sam Donald (Open Philanthropy) was launched in mid-2023, aimed at having people from across different organizations examine questions of governance and cultural reform to prevent similar issues from recurring.30
On funding concentration, EA Funds and Open Philanthropy worked to increase separation. Chairs of the Long-Term Future Fund and EA Infrastructure Fund who had also joined as Open Philanthropy staff planned to step down from their fund chair positions. The stated goals included increasing diversity of perspectives in the funding ecosystem, decreasing reliance on a single funder, and increasing willingness to disagree with Open Philanthropy. Open Philanthropy committed to matching small-donor contributions to the Long-Term Future Fund at a 2:1 ratio for up to $3.5 million total; that matching commitment was fully utilized by December 21, 2023.31
Criticisms and Controversies
Several distinct lines of criticism emerged from EA's response to the FTX collapse.
Failure to act on warnings: The most pointed criticism concerned the gap between EA's self-presentation as a movement committed to rigorous, evidence-based reasoning and the reported pattern of downplaying early warnings about SBF. Critics argued that this pattern reflected either insufficient due diligence or a willingness to overlook ethical concerns in exchange for access to large sums of money.2 EA defenders have argued that the warnings at the time were ambiguous, that no evidence of specific criminal conduct was available until much later, and that acting on unsubstantiated allegations about a donor could itself raise ethical concerns.
Public statements after the collapse: Some critics characterized EA leaders' post-collapse public statements as responses driven primarily by reputational concerns. MacAskill's emphasis that "earning to give" does not mean "ends justify the means" was interpreted by critics as addressing a concern that EA's own earlier promotion of SBF had helped to create.6 EA defenders noted that the substance of his statements was accurate and that clarifying what EA principles actually hold is an appropriate response to public mischaracterization.
Broader EA cultural critique: A strand of criticism argued that the FTX collapse was not an isolated aberration but symptomatic of systemic issues—including concentration of influence in a small intellectual elite, and a tendency to prioritize quantifiable impact metrics over concerns about institutional culture, power dynamics, and governance.26 EA philosophers have specifically contested the claim that EA's philosophical framework contributed causally to the fraud, distinguishing the institutional critique (which many EA insiders accept) from the philosophical critique (which most contest).32
Counterarguments: EA defenders noted that no criminal allegations were made against EA leaders, and that the underlying philosophical commitments of EA—rigorous reasoning, impartial concern for wellbeing, evidence-based giving—were not themselves implicated in the fraud. Survey data supported the view that EA community members largely distinguished between leadership failures and philosophical failures. Charlie Bresler of The Life You Can Save argued that the causes EA supports—global health, poverty alleviation, animal welfare—would not be durably harmed by the reputational fallout.5
Key Uncertainties
Several important questions about EA institutions' response to the FTX collapse remain unsettled or are only partially addressed by available evidence:
- Extent of prior knowledge: The full picture of what EA leaders knew about SBF's conduct and when they knew it has not been definitively established. Leaders' own accounts have been limited, and no formal independent inquiry specifically into EA institutions has been publicly reported as having concluded with detailed findings. The TIME reporting represents one account; EA leaders have not provided detailed public counter-narratives.
- Long-term funding impact: While short-term metrics showed significant declines in GWWC pledges and EA Forum engagement following the collapse, and the funding landscape for longtermist causes contracted substantially, the degree to which alternative funders compensated for the loss is only partially documented. Five new independent grantmaking bodies started in 2023, though most focused on longtermism or AI rather than biosecurity.16
- Reputational recovery: Whether the EA brand has recovered among key audiences—academics, potential donors, students, policymakers—is difficult to assess comprehensively. The Rethink Priorities student survey found limited FTX salience among non-EA-affiliated university students (5.6% mentioned it unprompted), suggesting that among those unfamiliar with EA, the collapse may have had limited impact on impressions of the movement.11 Some EA leaders claimed the movement was "back and more relevant than ever" by 2024, citing new donations.33 Critics noted that EA "still has major blind spots" as of that time.33
- Governance reform depth: The EV restructuring and cross-organizational reform project represent documented institutional responses, but the depth and durability of cultural reforms—particularly around due diligence on major donors and internal dissent—are not fully assessable from available public sources.
- EA-academic and policy relationships: The effect on EA's relationships with academic partners (Oxford, Cambridge, and others whose researchers received Future Fund grants that were subsequently clawed back) and with policymakers who had engaged with EA-adjacent institutions has not been comprehensively documented.
Sources
Footnotes
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Bankruptcy of FTX — Wikipedia — Bankruptcy of FTX — Wikipedia ↩
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Effective Altruist Leaders Were Warned About Sam Bankman-Fried Years Before FTX Collapsed — TIME — Effective Altruist Leaders Were Warned About Sam Bankman-Fried Years Before FTX Collapsed — TIME (March 15, 2023) ↩ ↩2 ↩3 ↩4 ↩5 ↩6 ↩7
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Bankruptcy of FTX — Wikipedia — Bankruptcy of FTX — Wikipedia ↩ ↩2
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The FTX Future Fund team has resigned — EA Forum — The FTX Future Fund team has resigned — EA Forum (Nick Beckstead et al., November 11, 2022) ↩ ↩2 ↩3
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What will FTX's collapse mean for global health and development? — Devex — What will FTX's collapse mean for global health and development? — Devex ↩ ↩2 ↩3 ↩4
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Citation rc-d9a5 (data unavailable — rebuild with wiki-server access) ↩ ↩2 ↩3
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Effective Altruism: How it started, how it's going after FTX collapse — Business Insider — Peter Singer, interview with The Guardian (December 2022), as reported in Effective Altruism: How it started, how it's going after FTX collapse — Business Insider ↩
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Open Phil is seeking applications from grantees impacted by recent events — EA Forum — Open Phil is seeking applications from grantees impacted by recent events — EA Forum (Open Philanthropy, November 16, 2022) ↩
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Support for Career Transition Plans — Open Philanthropy — Support for Career Transition Plans — Open Philanthropy (2022–2023) ↩
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FTX Community Response Survey Results — Rethink Priorities — FTX Community Response Survey Results — Rethink Priorities (David Moss and Willem Sleegers, early 2023) ↩ ↩2 ↩3 ↩4
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FTX Community Response Survey Results — EA Forum — FTX Community Response Survey Results — EA Forum (David Moss and Willem Sleegers, early 2023) ↩ ↩2 ↩3
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Updates on Community Health Survey Results — EA Forum — Updates on Community Health Survey Results — EA Forum ↩
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Nonprofits Worry About FTX Charitable Donation Clawbacks — Nonprofit Law Prof Blog — Nonprofits Worry About FTX Charitable Donation Clawbacks — Nonprofit Law Prof Blog (January 2023) ↩ ↩2 ↩3
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FTX Collapse Robs Researchers of Funding — PYMNTS.com — FTX Collapse Robs Researchers of Funding — PYMNTS.com (2023) ↩ ↩2
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Crypto Company's Collapse Strands Scientists — Science/AAAS — Crypto Company's Collapse Strands Scientists — Science/AAAS (2022–2023) ↩ ↩2
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Observations on the Funding Landscape of EA and AI Safety — EA Forum — Observations on the Funding Landscape of EA and AI Safety — EA Forum (October 2, 2023) ↩ ↩2
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Some Comments on Recent FTX-Related Events — EA Forum — Some Comments on Recent FTX-Related Events — EA Forum (November 10, 2022) ↩
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Citation rc-5bdd (data unavailable — rebuild with wiki-server access) ↩
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Nick Beckstead is Leaving the Effective Ventures Boards — EA Forum — Nick Beckstead is Leaving the Effective Ventures Boards — EA Forum (September 6, 2023) ↩ ↩2 ↩3
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Time Article Discussion — 'EA Leaders Were Warned About SBF' — EA Forum — Time Article Discussion — 'EA Leaders Were Warned About SBF' — EA Forum (March 15, 2023) ↩
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Citation rc-9aec (data unavailable — rebuild with wiki-server access) ↩
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Trial of Sam Bankman-Fried — Wikipedia — Trial of Sam Bankman-Fried — Wikipedia ↩
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Sam Bankman-Fried Sentenced to 25 Years in Prison for His FTX Crimes — NPR — Sam Bankman-Fried Sentenced to 25 Years in Prison for His FTX Crimes — NPR (March 28, 2024) ↩
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Linkpost: SBF Sentenced to 25 Years Jail — EA Forum — Linkpost: SBF Sentenced to 25 Years Jail — EA Forum (March 28, 2024) ↩
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Citation rc-8619 (data unavailable — rebuild with wiki-server access) ↩
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Reflections and Lessons from Effective Ventures — EA Forum — Reflections and Lessons from Effective Ventures — EA Forum (Zach Robinson, October 28, 2024) ↩ ↩2 ↩3 ↩4 ↩5
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CEA is Spinning Out of Effective Ventures — EA Forum — CEA is Spinning Out of Effective Ventures — EA Forum (Centre for Effective Altruism, January 18, 2024) ↩
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Upcoming Changes to the EV US and EV UK Leadership Teams — EA Forum — Upcoming Changes to the EV US and EV UK Leadership Teams — EA Forum (Effective Ventures, February 7, 2024) ↩
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The FTX Crisis Highlights a Deeper Cultural Problem Within EA — EA Forum — The FTX Crisis Highlights a Deeper Cultural Problem Within EA — EA Forum ↩ ↩2
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Update on Project on Reforms at EA Organizations — EA Forum — Update on Project on Reforms at EA Organizations — EA Forum (Julia Wise, Ozzie Gooen, Sam Donald, June 17, 2023) ↩
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EA Funds Organisational Update: Open Philanthropy Matching and Distancing — EA Forum — EA Funds Organisational Update: Open Philanthropy Matching and Distancing — EA Forum (EA Funds team, August 2023) ↩
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The Predictably Grievous Harms of Effective Altruism — OUP Blog — The Predictably Grievous Harms of Effective Altruism — OUP Blog (December 2022) ↩
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Giving on the Edge: Effective Altruism's Post-SBF Comeback — Hollywood Reporter — Giving on the Edge: Effective Altruism's Post-SBF Comeback — Hollywood Reporter (2024) ↩ ↩2
References
“The rate of new monthly pledges has declined ~-70% from 2023 vs. 2022 (even if one ignores January 2023’s -80% decline vs. January 2022 which might be due to the lack of a 2023 pledge drive .) FTX appears to have stopped, and possibly reversed, the long, consistent trends of growth these metrics had previously been experiencing.”
“In an interview with The Guardian in December 2022, the movement's forefather, Peter Singer, came to the defense of EA, but also acknowledged the harm the FTX controversy brought to the movement. He said, "I think in general, a lot more good has been done by earning-to-give than harm, at least up until the collapse of FTX, which has certainly caused a lot more harm than any other [example]." He also said, "wise, effective altruists and utilitarians know that honesty is the best policy."”
“As always, the EA Survey likely recruits disproportionately more highly engaged EAs and fewer less engaged EAs , so the overall results primarily reflect responses from people who are moderately or highly engaged in the EA community.”
“The team at the Rajalakshmi Children Foundation , an India-based group that received a grant from the FTX Future Fund to support the online education of children who excel in math, science, and technology, came across the news in the Effective Altruism Forum. “We have not received any communication from the foundation,” Akash Kulgod, one of its team members, told Devex via email. Rajalakshmi Children Foundation was expecting multiyear support from the FTX Future Fund, and is now scrambling to find other donors to fill that gap.”
6Upcoming Changes to the EV US and EV UK Leadership Teams — EA Forumforum.effectivealtruism.org·Blog post▸
“On EV UK’s board, Tasha McCauley and Claire Zabel will be stepping down from their trustee roles within the coming weeks. Tasha has served on the EV UK board since 2021 and Claire since 2019, and both originally wanted to step down from these roles approximately a year ago. They decided to stay on to guide EV through a trying time, determine future plans for the organization, and finalize our trustee recruitment efforts.”
The claim that EV adopted a communications policy requiring central approval for all FTX-related public communications is unsupported by the source.
“For years, the EA [Effective Altruism] community has emphasised the importance of integrity, honesty, and the respect of common-sense moral constraints. If customer funds were misused, then Sam did not listen; he must have thought he was above such considerations. A clear-thinking EA should strongly oppose “ends justify the means” reasoning.”
“SBF did terrible acts from many different moral viewpoints, including that of consequentialism. In addition to those he directly harmed, he harmed the EA movement. However, from review of what I have read, it seems as if he acted from a sincere desire to better the world and did so to the best of his (quite poor) judgment. Thus, to me, his punishment is a tragedy, though a necessary one.”
11Giving on the Edge: Effective Altruism's Post-SBF Comeback — Hollywood Reporterhollywoodreporter.com▸
“But Singer says EA has roared back with new relevance under a USAID-dismantling Trump presidency. “The movement is regrouping,” he says. “And various things have happened to make it more important than ever.””
WRONG DATE: The article states that some EA leaders claimed the movement was 'back and more relevant than ever' by 2024, citing new donations. However, the article was published in 2025 and references a 2024 uptick in giving. UNSUPPORTED: The claim mentions a Rethink Priorities student survey finding limited FTX salience among non-EA-affiliated university students (5.6% mentioned it unprompted). This information is not found in the provided source text.
“The Centre for Effective Altruism (CEA) is spinning out as a project of Effective Ventures Foundation UK and Effective Ventures US (known collectively as Effective Ventures or EV) to become an independent organisation.”
“The criticism that problems are inevitable when EA adherents follow the simplistic utilitarian idea that the ends justify the means, is correct as far as it goes. But the criticism says nothing about how EA is, at best, an utterly inadequate way of addressing global problems and, at worst, designed for the very sort of morally corrupt scandal in which it is now entangled.”
The source does not discuss the broader EA cultural critique, concentration of influence in a small intellectual elite, prioritization of quantifiable impact metrics, concerns about institutional culture, power dynamics, or governance. It also does not mention EA philosophers contesting the claim that EA's philosophical framework contributed causally to the fraud, or distinguishing between institutional and philosophical critiques.
15EA Funds Organisational Update: Open Philanthropy Matching and Distancingforum.effectivealtruism.org·Blog post▸
“UPDATE 2023/12/21: Open Phil's $3.5M donation matching for the Long-Term Future Fund has now been filled [1] .”
“In December 2022, Rethink Priorities, in collaboration with CEA, surveyed the EA community [1] [2] in order to gather “ perspectives on how the FTX crisis has impacted the community’s views of the effective altruism movement, its organizations, and leaders .””
“Currently the people on the project are Julia Wise (employee at Centre for Effective Altruism, board member at GiveWell), Ozzie Gooen (president at Quantified Uncertainty Research Institute, board member at Rethink Charity, former board member at Rethink Priorities), and Sam Donald (strategy fellow at Open Philanthropy, former staff at COVID taskforce at UK Cabinet Office, former staff at McKinsey).”
18The FTX Crisis Highlights a Deeper Cultural Problem Within EAforum.effectivealtruism.org·Blog post▸
“EA projects are often run by small groups of young idealistic people who have similar educational and social backgrounds , who often socialise together, and (in many cases) participate in romantic relationships with one another - The case of Sam Bankman-Fried and Caroline Ellison is certainly not the only such example in the EA community.”
“The person best placed to answer this would be MacAskill – he helped lay out EA’s philosophical framework, has sat on the boards of many major EA institutions and formerly described Bankman-Fried as a “collaborator” – but he has remained conspicuously quiet. He declined to be interviewed for this article, citing work commitments, and hasn’t commented on Bankman-Fried publicly since June, when he said that “even in hindsight” he had no reason to suspect the billionaire of fraud.”
The claim that MacAskill acknowledged the need for self-examination and for EA to make clear it does not see itself as above common-sense ethical norms is not directly supported by the source. The source only mentions MacAskill's expression of "utter rage" and acknowledgement that he had not heeded concerns that his own moral ideas could be misused. The claim that MacAskill declined to be interviewed by the New Statesman is accurate, but the reason given in the source is 'work commitments', not necessarily because of SBF's conviction. The claim that MacAskill had offered no further detailed public account of the events as of November 2023 is not directly supported by the source. The source only mentions that he hasn’t commented on Bankman-Fried publicly since June.
“Other recipients did return their donations, such as the journalism non-profit ProPublica, which said in December it would return the initial $1.6 million of what was meant to be a three-year, $5 million grant from Building a Stronger Future, a foundation run Bankman-Fried and his brother, Gabe Bankman-Fried.”
unsupported: The Alignment Research Center voluntarily returned its $1.25 million FTX Foundation grant, stating the money "morally (if not legally) belongs to FTX customers or creditors." unsupported: FTX paid the Center for AI Safety $6.5 million between May and September 2022; the FTX bankruptcy estate subsequently probed this payment. unsupported: Stanford's Center for Innovation in Global Health had received $1.5 million from the Future Fund for pandemic-prevention seed grants and removed public mention of the grant from its communications following the collapse; Stanford has not publicly explained this decision.
“However, only 6% reported having stopped promoting EA projects, ideas or actions permanently .”
“In delivering his sentence, Judge Lewis Kaplan cautioned that Bankman-Fried "will be in a position to do something very bad in the future, and it's not a trivial risk."”
23Observations on the Funding Landscape of EA and AI Safety — EA Forumforum.effectivealtruism.org·Blog post▸
“EA Fund’s Long-Term Future Fund and Infrastructure Fund report (roughly estimated funding gaps of $450k/month and $550k/month respectively, over the next 6 months.”
The source does not mention Open Philanthropy pausing funding commitments in the immediate aftermath of FTX's implosion. It only mentions that EA Funds reported funding gaps following the implosion. The source does not specify that Open Philanthropy paused funding specifically in 'Potential Risks from Advanced AI, Biosecurity and Pandemic Preparedness, and EA Community Growth'.
“It’s not entirely clear how EA leaders reacted to the warnings. Sources familiar with the discussions told TIME that the concerns were downplayed, rationalized as typical startup squabbles, or dismissed as “he said-she said,” as two people put it.”
26Regulatory Inquiry into Effective Ventures Foundation UK — EA Forumforum.effectivealtruism.org·Blog post▸
27Nick Beckstead is Leaving the Effective Ventures Boards — EA Forumforum.effectivealtruism.org·Blog post▸
“On 23rd August, Nick Beckstead stepped down from the boards of Effective Ventures UK and Effective Ventures US.”
28Open Phil is Seeking Applications from Grantees Impacted by Recent Eventsforum.effectivealtruism.org·Blog post▸
29Time Article Discussion — 'EA Leaders Were Warned About SBF' — EA Forumforum.effectivealtruism.org·Blog post▸
“I would still like an argument that they shouldn't be removed from boards , when almost any other org would. I would like the argument made and seen to be made.”
30Nonprofits Worry About FTX Charitable Donation Clawbacks — Nonprofit Law Prof Bloglawprofessors.typepad.com▸
“EV commissioned an independent investigation about the relationship between EV and FTX from the law firm Mintz, which concluded in September 2023 (and was announced by me on the Forum in December 2023 and followed by a statement from Mintz). The investigation included dozens of interviews as well as reviews of tens of thousands of messages and documents. Mintz found no evidence that anyone at EV (including employees, leaders of EV-sponsored projects, and trustees) was aware of the criminal fraud of which Sam Bankman-Fried has now been convicted.”
“Because of this, we are pausing most new longtermist funding commitments (that is, commitments within Potential Risks from Advanced Artificial Intelligence , Biosecurity & Pandemic Preparedness , and Effective Altruism Community Growth ) until we gain more clarity, which we hope will be within a month or so.”
The claim mentions specific funding gaps for EA Funds' Long-Term Future Fund and Infrastructure Fund, but the source does not provide these specific numbers. The claim states Open Philanthropy paused most new longtermist funding commitments in specific areas, which is accurate, but the source does not explicitly state that this happened in the "immediate aftermath" of FTX's implosion.